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In this issue of Neuron, Hannula and Ranganath provide striking evidence that hippocampal activity predicts
eye movements that reveal memory for the past even when participants’ overt memory decisions are in error.
Their findings bear on an ongoing debate about the relationship between mnemonic awareness and hippo-
campal function.Do our eyes reveal more than we are able
to disclose? Consider for a moment the
following scenario: a witness to a robbery
is confronted with a line up and asked to
single out the culprit. The witness, feeling
unsure, declares he is unable to identify
the miscreant, and yet his eyes tell a dif-
ferent story, being drawn unknowingly to
the perpetrator’s face, revealing a memory
of the past that the witness cannot con-
sciously report. In this issue of Neuron,
Hannula and Ranganath (2009) demon-
strate that the hippocampus underpins
such eye-movement phenomena, pro-
viding a tantalizing glimpse into a mne-
monic milieu apparently beyond aware-
ness.
The idea that unconscious (i.e., implicit
or nondeclarative) memories exert pow-
erful influences on behavior and depend
on distinct neural mechanisms from
consciously accessible (i.e., explicit or
declarative) memories has a long history.
Over the past few decades, extensive
evidence has established the critical role
of the hippocampus and surrounding
medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures
in conscious memory for life’s events.
Moreover, repeated demonstration that
impaired conscious recollection following
hippocampal damage is accompanied
by preserved skill learning, habit learn-
ing, and priming—all forms of memory
that can unconsciously shape be-
havior—has motivated the hypothesis
that the hippocampus plays a selective
role in conscious memory for facts and
events (Schacter, 1987; Squire et al.,
2004).The view that hippocampal mnemonic
function is intimately linked to awareness,
while dominant, has recently been chal-
lenged by a handful of empirical findings
suggesting that amnesic patients with
hippocampal lesions also show deficits
on tasks that putatively assess implicit
memory for the relations between event
elements (Chun and Phelps, 1999; Ryan
et al., 2000). For instance, Ryan et al.
(2000) demonstrated that amnesic
patients fail to direct their gaze to parts
of a previously studied scene that contain
novel relations between scene elements,
whereas control participants exhibit such
eye-movement phenomena even when
they lack awareness that the scene has
changed across repetitions. These and
other observations, while controversial in
their own right (Manns and Squire, 2001;
Preston and Gabrieli, 2008; Smith et al.,
2006), offer support for an alternative
view of hippocampal mnemonic function,
namely that the hippocampus is critical
for relational memory—i.e., memory for
the relations between the individual ele-
ments of an experience—and contributes
to performance irrespective of whether
the participant is aware or unaware that
relational knowledge has been retrieved
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993).
Hannula and Ranganath offer a fresh
perspective on this debate, by combining
eye-movement recordings with functional
MRI to generate a rich data set linking
neural processes to behavioral expres-
sions of memory retrieval. In their experi-
ment, healthy volunteers first encoded
pictures of individual faces superimposedNeuron 63, Son individual scenes. Subsequently,
during test trials, participants were initially
presented with a studied scene and in-
structed to remember the face with which
it had previously been paired, and then,
after a delay, were asked to select the
matching face from a three-face choice
array (the distractors had been previously
encountered with other scenes at study).
Critically, eye movements were recorded
during test trials, enabling assessment
of whether participants’ gazes were
drawn to the matching face in the array
even before they explicitly reported their
memory judgment, and perhaps even
when their subsequent choice was
erroneous. In this way, the authors sought
to (1) demonstrate the influence of rela-
tional memory on eye movements and
reveal their neural origin and (2) determine
whether such relational eye-movement
effects (hereafter termed ‘‘REMEs’’) are
expressed even when subjective reports
are erroneous, which might suggest that
REMEs are a manifestation of uncon-
scious relational memory.
To accomplish their first aim, the
authors categorized test trials according
to whether participants disproportion-
ately viewed either the matching face
(DMP trials) or one of the distractor faces
(DNMP trials). What they found was that,
as early as 500–1000 ms after the onset
of the face array, viewing times of the
matching face on DMP trials were signifi-
cantly greater than of the selected face on
DNMP trials, consistent with an influence
of relational memory retrieval during
DMP trials. Furthermore, neural activityeptember 10, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 561
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and Overt Judgmentsin the hippocampus and several adjacent
MTL structures was significantly greater
during DMP trials as compared to DNMP
trials, suggesting that these brain regions
support relational memory retrieval during
the scene cue period that directs partici-
pants’ gaze to the matching face during
the choice array phase.
To address their second aim, the au-
thors next asked whether their two behav-
ioral measures (REMEs versus choice
accuracy) could be dissociated—that is,
is relational memory evident in eye-move-
ment behavior even when the participant
fails to select the matching face? Ad-
dressing this question was far from
straightforward, because, perhaps unsur-
prisingly, the two behavioral indices were
highly correlated, with memory accuracy
being markedly higher on DMP (83%)
than on DNMP (35%) trials. To gain
leverage on this issue, the authors there-
fore focused on trials where the partici-
pant’s subsequent memory decision
during the choice array was incorrect,
median splitting incorrect trials into high-
and low-viewing trials depending on time562 Neuron 63, September 10, 2009 ª2009spent viewing the matching—but ulti-
mately not selected—face. Strikingly,
activation in the hippocampus during the
preceding scene cue phase again pre-
dicted longer subsequent viewing of the
matching face, implying that successful
relational memory retrieval is evident in
eye-movement behavior even when the
participant’s overt memory judgment is
incorrect.
Given the observation that activity in
the hippocampus was intimately linked
to the expression of REMEs irrespective
of memory accuracy, one might wonder
whether accurate memory decisions were
associated with activity in other neural
structures. Indeed, in a final analysis,
Hannula and Ranganath observed that
activity in regions within lateral prefrontal
cortex (PFC) was modulated by memory
judgment accuracy, being greater on cor-
rect versus incorrect trials. Further, lateral
PFC showed increased functional cou-
pling with the hippocampus during cor-
rect versus incorrect trials, suggesting
that relational memory retrieval per se
relies on the hippocampus, but accurateElsevier Inc.overt relational memory decisions neces-
sitate interactions between MTL struc-
tures and the PFC.
While previous studies implicating the
hippocampus in the generation of un-
aware memory-guided eye movements
have been challenged (Smith et al.,
2006), the current study provides compel-
ling evidence demonstrating that neural
activity in the hippocampus predicts
REME expression, preceding their ap-
pearance by as much as several seconds.
Perhaps even more intriguingly, the ob-
servation that hippocampal activity also
predicted REME expression even when
overt memory decisions were erroneous
raises the possibility that REMEs and
explicit relational memory judgments
index the outputs of two anatomically
segregated pathways that drive distinct
aspects of behavior, the former perhaps
generated in the absence of conscious
awareness, and the latter reflecting
explicit goal-directed behavior (see Fig-
ure 1). As such, Hannula and Ranganath’s
data dovetail with recent work showing
that hippocampal activity can distinguish
the old/new status of stimuli, even when
participants’ recognition judgments fail
to do so (Daselaar et al., 2006; Kirwan
et al., 2009).
Interestingly, Hannula and Ranganath
eschew claims that the eye-movement
effects they observe are manifestations
of implicit memory, preferring to frame
their results in terms of a dissociation
between different behavioral indices of
relational memory retrieval. The authors
are likely wise to do so, as a strong con-
clusion that the present REMEs reflect
unconscious (unaware) memory would
appear somewhat premature given the
data. Rather, while the observed dissoci-
ation between REME expression and
choice behavior is certainly consistent
with the conclusion that REMEs reflect
unaware relational memory, an alternative
account remains viable. Namely, it is
possible that participants were in fact
conscious of the mnemonic status of the
match face at the time of prolonged
viewing (i.e., the 500–1000 ms period)
but were unable to or chose not to act on
this information 1 s later when the memory
decision was required. Why might this
have been the case? One possibility is
that other cognitive processes intervene
between the occurrence of REMEs and
Neuron
Previewsthe memory judgments, which result in
participants deviating from their seem-
ingly accurate course to ultimately select-
ing an erroneous face (see Figure 1).
According to this perspective, REMEs
may reflect early emerging, and perhaps
relatively pure, signatures of memory
retrieval that are overridden by the subse-
quent accumulation of evidence from
other sources (e.g., from the consider-
ation of alternative options) which eventu-
ally determine the participant’s ultimate
behavioral choice (Gold and Shadlen,
2007).
The interpretative caution shown by
Hannula and Ranganath, as well as past
challenges in convincingly documenting
the existence of implicit relational mem-
ory, begs the question: What kind of
evidence would be required to demon-
strate that participants were truly unaware
at the time of relational eye-movement
expression? One strategy for tackling
this issue might be to modify the parame-
ters of the task, so that participants were
forced to make speeded memory judg-
ments during the same temporal window
as REME expression. If it were possible
to drive speeded response accuracy to
demonstrably chance levels, perhaps by
reducing the temporal gap between
scene cue and face array to a few hundred
milliseconds, the continued expression of
REMEs would provide more compelling
evidence that participants lack aware-
ness of the match status of the target
face at time of REME expression. Even if
this manipulation failed to reduce re-
sponse accuracy to chance, the exis-
tence of REMEs on trials where partici-
pants made cotemporaneous incorrect
choices would still offer some support
for the contention that REMEs reflect
implicit memory. However, it is worth
noting that, while speeded responses, in
combination with prior work (Ryan et al.,
2000), may provide evidence to support
the claim that REMEs are a manifestation
of implicit (unaware) memory, providing
definitive evidence that subjects truly
lack awareness is notoriously difficult
(Shanks and St. John, 1994).On the other hand, if the proposed ex-
perimental manipulations failed to yield a
dissociation between REMEs and choice
accuracy, this would challenge the notion
that REMEs occur outside awareness.
Instead, this would imply that Hannula
and Ranganath’s participants may have
been conscious of the match status of
targets at the time of REMEs, but were
subsequently led astray during incorrect
trials through the operation of intervening
cognitive processes (see Figure 1). One
way to provide evidence for this account
might be to have participants declare their
choices at two time points: first at the time
of REME expression and then a few
seconds later as in the current experi-
ment. If the choice data reveal that partic-
ipants sometimes select the correct
matching face at time of REME expres-
sion, but subsequently render an incor-
rect response, this would favor the
hypothesis that REMEs and conscious
awareness are intimately linked.
While the relationship between REMEs
and implicit memory remains uncertain,
the study by Hannula and Ranganath
highlights the utility of eye-movement
data as an alternative, and potentially
more sensitive, behavioral assay of mem-
ory retrieval and hippocampal function.
As the authors point out, the wider use
of eye-movement measures is also likely
to be a fruitful approach with which to
explore hippocampal function in a range
of settings where memory judgments are
troublesome to obtain (e.g., animals,
infants). REMEs may also prove a purer
assay of memory, as compared to explicit
memory reports, which can have the
added complication of tending to change
the way in which participants encode and
retrieve information. As such, REMEs
complement an emerging literature on
the neural signals of novelty/familiarity,
which are readily measured in tasks lack-
ing explicit demands to learn and re-
member (Kumaran and Maguire, 2009).
Moreover, eye-movement phenomena
provide a temporally precise measure
that indexes the evolution of relational
memory expression from perception toNeuron 63, Saction, a process that may depend on
interactions between the MTL and PFC
as the authors’ findings suggest.
Survival in an ever-changing world de-
pends on the capacity to rapidly express
memory. That eye movements may be
guided by memory for the past is no
longer surprising. That hippocampal rela-
tional memory signals may underpin what
the eyes ‘‘know,’’ even when conscious
retrieval fails, is what intrigues. Continued
exploration of the link between eye move-
ments and memory may eventually re-
solve key debates about the hippocam-
pus’s function and perhaps even the
very nature of unconscious memory itself.
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